Foreign Direct Investment: Effects, Complementarities, and Promotion by Alfaro, Laura
 
Foreign Direct Investment: Effects, Complementarities, and
Promotion
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Alfaro, Laura. "Foreign Direct Investment: Effects,
Complementarities, and Promotion." Harvard Business School
Working Paper, No. 15-006, August 2014. (Chapter in preparation
for edited book on Foreign Direct Investment, Interamerican
Development Bank-IADB.)
Accessed February 17, 2015 4:52:00 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13350440
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP 
Copyright © 2014 by Laura Alfaro 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and 
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working 
papers are available from the author. 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment: 
Effects, Complementarities, 
and Promotion  
 
Laura Alfaro 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
15-006 
 
August 5, 2014 
 Foreign Direct Investment:  Effects, Complementarities, and Promotion 
Laura Alfaro 
Harvard Business School and NBER
1 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1996, Intel Corporation announced the construction of a semiconductor assembly plant 
in Costa Rica. Production started in 1998. Intel’s investment was six times what had been the 
annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in this Central American country of 3.5 million people 
(see  Spar,  1998)  and  it  marked  the  expansion  of  FDI  in  electronics,  medical  devices,  and 
business services by companies such as Boston Scientific, Hewlett Packard, IBM, and Procter & 
Gamble. But Intel’s investment in Costa Rica was also emblematic of the desire of Central 
American  countries  to  move  away  from  textile  and  clothing  manufacturing  into  higher-end 
manufacturing and services, in hopes of boosting development efforts by promoting technology 
upgrades,  knowledge  spillovers,  and  linkages  of  foreign  with  domestic  firms.  In  2014,  the 
company announced the restructuring of the facilities. Intel’s Global Services Center as well as 
the company’s Engineering and Design Center will remain in their current location in Costa 
Rica. These operations will gain relevance in Research & Development related activities. As part 
of its global strategy, the company will relocate its assembly and test operation to Asia, where 
these activities will be concentrated. Headcount for R&D services operations currently reaches 
1200 people and new positions were recently been announced. 
Figure 1. Central America and the Dominican Republic: FDI Net Inflows, 1977-2011 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2013. 
During this period, FDI in the region increased from less than US$1.3 billion in 1996, 
close to 1.6% of the region’s GDP, to US$4.6 billion in 1998, reaching US$11 billion in 2011, 
approximately 5% of GDP. However, as Figure 1 shows,
2 the increase was far from linear, being 
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1 Laura Alfaro, Harvard Business School, Morgan 263, Boston MA 02163, USA (e-mail: lalfaro@hbs.edu). The 
author thanks Sebastian Auguste and Osmel Enrique Manzano for valuable comments. Katelyn Barry, John Elder, 
and Hillary White, provided invaluable research assistance.  The author was Minister of Planning and National 
Economic Policy for Costa Rica, 2010-2012. 
2 The figure and analysis include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua as well as 
the Dominican Republic (usually included in regional analyses due to its similarities).  
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characterized by slowdowns associated with world events such as the subprime mortgage crisis 
in the United States and the related worldwide Great Recession of 2008-2009. 
Throughout its history, foreign investment in Central America had followed a series of 
cycles driven by a combination of external and internal—or push and pull—factors, geographic 
and localization advantages, and a variety of promotion strategies and development models.  The 
first cycle, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was largely driven by geographic 
advantages associated with agricultural production and mineral extraction with MNCs typically 
behaving as enclaves. Following the Great Depression and the stagnation of the world economy, 
a second stage, lasting from the 1950s through the 1970s, was driven by tariff jumping. This was 
part  of  the  region’s  import  substitution  model,  associated  with  the  formation  of  the  Central 
American Common Market.  Foreign companies invested mostly in textiles, food and beverages, 
and light industry.  Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, yet another cycle began with the 
renewed push towards export-led models. Central American countries created various schemes to 
attract investment and promote manufacturing exports, often under export processing zones.
3 
 
Because FDI includes technology and know-how as well as foreign capital, it came to be 
seen during this stage as an engine of growth, almost guaranteed to boost the host country’s 
development.
4 Knowledge spillovers and backward and forward linkages between foreign and 
domestic firms were expected to bring productivity gains, technology transfers, new processes, 
improved  managerial  skills  and  know-how,  employee  training,  international  production 
networks,  and  access  to  markets.
5  Foreign  investment,  by  complementing  domestic  savings, 
could  create  employment,  help  diversify  exports,  foster  linkages,  transform  the  production 
structure, and upgrade the technology of the production processes, fueling growth that, in turn, 
would foster development. 
 
In  pursuit  of  all  these  potential  externalities,  governments  in  many  developed  and 
developing countries have, over several decades, substantially reduced barriers to foreign direct 
investment and offered special incentives to attract foreign firms and foster relationships between 
multinational  enterprises  (MNEs)  and  local  firms.
6  In  Central  America,  for  example, 
governments have used fiscal and financial incentives and promotion strategies such as special 
processing zones to encourage foreign companies to set up operations.  
 
Though Central America is small, it is by no means homogeneous. Costa Rica, reacting at 
an early stage to the limits of the textile and clothing industries, emerged as the leader in product 
diversification, attracting firms in intermediate- and high-technology sectors. In Panama, the 
Canal has served as a platform for the flow of FDI, particularly in financial services. El Salvador 
and Guatemala aim to diversify their investments by attracting business services, while Honduras 
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3 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2010). 
4 The academic literature on foreign direct investment is vast and has been surveyed many times. See Markusen 
(1995), Caves (1996), Blomström and Kokko (1998), Hanson (2001), Lipsey (2002), Markusen (2002), Alfaro and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2004), Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004), Görg and Greenaway (2004), Moran (2007), Alfaro, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2009), Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010), Kose et al. (2009, 2011), and Alfaro and 
Johnson (2012) for surveys on determinants, effects, spillover channels, and empirical findings. See also Yeaple 
(2013) and Antras and Yeaple (2014) for recent overviews of the theoretical literature on multinational firms.  
5 See Caves (1996) and Blomström and Kokko (1998) for discussions on technology transfers. 
6 On the debate behind incentives to attract FDI, see Hanson (2001) and Blomström and Kokko (2003).   3 
and Nicaragua continue to attract firms in low-skill manufacturing. The Dominican Republic, 
usually associated with the region, receives investments in textiles, tourism, and intermediate-
technology sectors.  
 
But the impact of FDI on Central American, in fact on the host economies in general, is 
difficult to assess.
 Indeed, the empirical evidence for FDI generating the expected positive effects 
is ambiguous at both the micro and macro levels.
7 
In a survey of the literature, Hanson (2001) 
argues that there is only weak evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for host countries. 
In  a  review  of  the  micro-level  analysis  literature  on  spillovers  from  foreign-owned  to 
domestically owned firms, Görg and Greenaway (2004) conclude that the effects are mostly 
negative. Surveying the macro-level empirical research, Lipsey (2002) notes that there is no 
consistent  relation  between  the  size  of  inward  FDI  stocks  or  flows  and  GDP  or  growth. 
Blomström and Kokko (2003) conclude from their review of the literature that spillovers are not 
automatic,  since  local  conditions  have  an  important  influence  on  firms’  adoption  of  foreign 
technologies and skills.  Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek  (2010), also finding conditional 
effects, show that not all countries satisfy the “preconditions” for taking advantage of FDI’s 
potential benefits.
 
The size of spillovers from foreign firms depends on the domestic firms’ 
ability to respond to new entrants, new technology, and new competition.
 These characteristics 
are, in turn, determined to some extent by country characteristics such as the levels of human 
capital  and  financial  development.  Weaknesses  in  these  areas  may  reduce  the  capacity  of 
domestic  industries  to  absorb  new  technologies  and  to  respond  to  the  challenges  and 
opportunities  presented  by  foreign  entrants—in  other  words,  to  benefit  from  FDI.  Similar 
conclusions are reached by Moran (2007), Nuno and Fontoura (2007), Meyer and Sinani (2009), 
Bruno and Campos (2013), and Iršová and Tomáš (2013). 
 
The type of investment attracted might itself signal host-country limitations. For instance, 
resource-based countries with low per-capita income frequently report fairly high FDI inflows. 
But  in  such  cases,  sometimes  the  MNCs  behave  as  enclaves,  importing  all  their  inputs  and 
restricting  their  local  activities  to  hiring  labor,  and  thus  do  not  contribute  significantly  to 
economic growth and development. 
Thus, there appears to be a significant gap between what the doers think they are doing 
and what the scholars see happening. Do the mixed empirical results imply that national policies 
to attract FDI are unwarranted?  In Central America, FDI seems to have be important for the 
creation of the textile-maquiladora industry and the diversification and expansion of exports.  
But does this justify special treatment?    
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have always stirred strong emotions, both in home 
and host countries.  In home/parent countries, the debate has ranged from those who worry that 
foreign  investment  by  MNCs  lowers  wages  and  destroys  jobs,  entrepreneurship,  and 
communities  at  home  to  those  who  argue  that  firms  must  invest  abroad  in  order  to  stay 
competitive in an increasingly international environment. Recipient countries have an ambiguous 
attitude towards MNC as well. Some policy makers argue that FDI can play an important role in 
accelerating their countries’ development efforts by bringing in capital and technology. Others 
view multinational corporations as monopolistic entities that grow through the exploitation of 
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7 See Section 3 for an overview of the empirical literature.   4 
their  competitive  advantage  in  technology,  bringing  economic  dislocation  and  dependence, 
exploiting  natural  resources,  and  threatening  local  culture  and  sovereignty.  Are  both  claims 
partially true, with the effects varying by sector and type of investment? 
 
To tackle these questions, it is helpful to understand the evolution of the literature on 
FDI.    One  strand  of  the  literature  acknowledges  that  the  benefits  generated  by  FDI  are  not 
exogenous, but rather are conditional on the presence of complementary policies and conditions 
that  help  firms,  regions,  and  countries  absorb  those  benefits.    This  strand  does  not  find  an 
exogenous  positive  effect  of  FDI  on  economic  growth,  but  rather  finds  positive  effects 
conditional  on  local  characteristics,  notably  the  policy  environment  and  institutional  quality 
(Balasubramanayam  et  al.,  1996,  Bénassy-Quéré,  Coupet,  and  Mayer,  2007),  human  capital 
(Borensztein et al., 1998), local financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010, sector characteristics 
(Alfaro and Charlton, forthcoming), sectoral composition (Aykut and Sayek, 2007), and market 
structure (Alfaro et al., 2010). 
The second strand seeks to understand not whether but how FDI affects growth, paying 
particular attention to labor-market interactions and the linkages generated between foreign and 
domestic firms. A related set of papers analyze the different effects on growth of different kinds 
of FDI, analyzed by sector of investment, form of investment, and origin of capital.  
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.    Section  2  presents  definitions  and 
summarizes  the  likely  motives  for  foreign  direct  investment.    Section  3  discusses  general 
potential  effects  of  FDI  on  the  local  economy  and  summarizes  recent  findings  on 
complementarities  between  FDI  and  local  policies,  conditions,  and  institutions.    Section  4 
summarizes new efforts to understand the mechanisms and channels by which host countries can 
benefit from multinational activity and from the different types of FDI.  Section 5 summarizes 
the role of regional pull and push factors and promotion strategies and summarizes the debate on 
the use of incentives to attract foreign companies.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Definition of Terms and Motivation for Foreign Direct Investment and Multinational 
Activity
8 
A  multinational  enterprise  is  an  enterprise  that  controls  and  manages  production 
establishments—plants—in at least two countries.
9  A multinational corporation or transnational 
corporation is an enterprise which owns and controls income-generating assets in more than one 
country. The acquisition of such assets involves a foreign investment either through portfolio 
investment—the  acquisition  of  foreign  securities  and  bonds—or  through  foreign  direct 
investment—the construction of new production facilities (commonly referred to as “greenfield” 
investments)  or  the  acquisition  of  existing  firms  (“brownfield”  investment  or  mergers  and 
acquisition). Firms can also reinvest profits in their current operations.  Parents are entities in the 
source country that control productive facilities—called affiliates—in host countries.  
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8 For recent trends, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2013). 
9 Caves (1996:1) uses the term “enterprise” rather than “company” to direct attention to the top level of coordination 
in the hierarchy of business decisions; a subsidiary may itself be a multinational.    5 
As noted by Graham and Krugman (1995: 7), “The very definition of FDI poses serious 
problems” as what we seek to measure is the extent to which foreign firms and individuals 
control the host country production/facility/assets.
10 That is, it is not easy to define precisely 
what is implied by control and even an entity’s nationality can be hard to define. As Desai (2009) 
notes, “It used to be the case that “production or distribution might move abroad, [while] the loci 
of critical managerial decision-making and the associated headquarters functions were thought to 
remain bundled and fixed. Now firms are unbundling headquarters functions and reallocating 
them worldwide. The defining characteristics of what made a firm belong to a country—where it 
was incorporated, where it was listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location of its 
headquarters, are no longer unified nor are they bound to one country” 
 
Since  control  can  be  exercised  in  many  ways,  the  measurement  of  FDI  poses  some 
difficulties.   The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTAD) defines FDI 
as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest in and control 
of an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor. FDI inflows are capital 
provided by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise.
11 The International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF)  “International  Financial  Statistics”  defines  net  FDI  inflows  as  the  net  inflows  of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance 
of payments.  The World Bank defines foreign direct investment (net inflows in the reporting 
economy, in current US$) as investment that is made to acquire a lasting management interest 
(usually 10 percent of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a country other than that of the 
investor (defined according to residency), the investor's purpose being an effective voice in the 
management of the enterprise. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.  
 
   These institutions, as well as most national agencies, such as the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, classify an investment as direct if a foreign investor holds at least 10% of a local 
firm’s equity. This arbitrary threshold is meant to reflect the notion that large stockholders, even 
if they do not hold a majority stake, will have a strong say in a company’s decisions and will 
participate in and influence its management.  When a foreign investor purchases a local firm’s 
securities or bonds without exercising control over the firm, that investment is regarded as a 
portfolio  investment.  Regardless  of  measurement  difficulties,  it  is  the  desire  for  partial  or 
complete control over the activities of a firm in another country that distinguishes FDI from 
portfolio investment. Foreign direct investment is characterized by the ownership of assets in one 
country by residents of another one with the purpose of controlling those assets. 
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10 “Direct investment is ownership that carries with it actual control over that which is owned which is the aspect 
that  distinguishes  direct  investment  from  portfolio  investment—establishment  of  a  claim  on  an  asset  with  the 
purpose of realizing returns,” Graham and Krugman (1995: 9).  
11 A parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home 
country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake (10% or more).  A foreign affiliate is an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in another economy, owns a stake that permits a 
lasting interest in the management of the enterprise (an equity stake of 10% for an incorporated enterprise or its 
equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise). FDI stock is the value of the share of the foreign enterprise capital and 
reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the 
parent enterprise.  See UNCTAD (2013).   6 
 
Given the diversity among MNEs and the different motives to invest abroad, the patterns 
of foreign investment have long been recognized to be complex.
 Firms can invest abroad to serve 
a  market  directly;  to  gain  access  to  inputs,  raw  materials,  or  labor;  to  increase  operational 
efficiency; or simply to keep competitors from acquiring strategic assets (see Desai, 2009). An 
alternative  categorization  by  motivation  recognizes  resource-seeking  or  supply-oriented  FDI, 
designed to gain access to natural resources such as minerals or to unskilled labor; market-
seeking or demand-oriented FDI, designed to satisfy one or several foreign markets; efficiency-
seeking  or  rationalized  FDI,  designed  to  promote  a  more  efficient  division  of  labor  or 
specialization in an MNE’s portfolio of foreign and domestic assets; or strategic-asset-seeking 
FDI, designed to protect or augment a firm’s specific advantages and/or to reduce those of its 
competitors.
12  
 
However, the fundamental question underlying FDI activities is always this: Why is an 
investor willing to acquire a foreign firm or build a new factory abroad? After all, there are 
added costs of doing business in another country, including communication and transport costs, 
the expense of stationing personnel abroad, and barriers due to language, customs, and exclusion 
from local business and government networks.
 Many firms could be multinational but choose not 
to be. While many countries have many MNEs, others have none.  
 
It may seem that the answer is simply the ordinary pursuit of profit: The multinational 
firm expects to enjoy either larger annual cash flows or a lower cost of capital. But how can a 
foreign firm offset the local firm’s advantage of superior knowledge of the market, legal and 
political systems, language, and culture?   
One explanation, known as the cost-of-capital theory, is that the investing foreign firms, 
because of their size or structure, have access to lower-cost funds not available to local firms. In 
this  view,  multinationals  are  simply  arbitragers  moving  capital  from  low-return  countries  to 
high-return ones. However, if the lower cost of capital were the only advantage, why would a 
foreign investor endure the headaches of operating a firm in a different political, legal, and 
cultural environment rather than simply making a portfolio investment?  Evidence shows that 
investors often fail to bring all the investment capital with them when they take control of a 
foreign company; instead, they tend to finance an important share of their investment in the local 
market.  FDI  flows—particularly  among  developed  countries  and  increasingly  emerging 
markets—proceed in both directions and often in the same industry. As MIT economic historian 
Charles Kindleberger noted, “Direct investment may thus be capital movement, but it is more 
than that.”
13   
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12 For analytical simplicity, FDI has usually been classified as either horizontal or vertical. A firm engages in 
horizontal FDI when it replicates a subset of its activities or production process in another country; in other words, 
when the same (horizontal) state of the production process is duplicated. See Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), and 
Markusen and Venables (2000). Firms engage in vertical FDI when the fragmentation of production is by function; 
that is, when they break up the value-added chain, often motivated by cost considerations arising from factor cost 
differences. Helpman’s (1984) category of export-platform FDI, in which the affiliates’ output is (largely) sold in a 
third market, has also been increasingly recognized. Empirical evidence on the different types includes Brainard 
(1997), Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001, 2005), Markusen and Maskus 
(2002), Yeaple (2003, 2006), Ekholm et al. (2007), and Alfaro and Charlton (2009). 
13 Kindleberger (1969): 3.    7 
Given the limitations of applying the traditional international-finance approach, Hymer 
(1960) proposed a more broadly accepted framework, derived from the industrial organization 
literature,  in  which  real  (as  opposed  to  financial)  factors  explain  the  location  decisions  of 
multinational firms.
14  This view suggests that a firm engages in FDI not because of differences 
in the cost of capital but because certain assets are worth more under foreign rather than local 
control, which allows the firm to compete in unfamiliar environments. An investor’s decision to 
acquire a foreign company or build a foreign plant rather than simply exporting or engaging in 
other forms of contractual arrangement with foreign firms thus involves (a) ownership of an 
asset, (b) the production location, and (c) the choice of whether or not to keep the asset internal 
to the firm.  
First,  a  firm  can  possess  some  ownership  advantage—a  firm-specific  asset  (such  as 
patents, technology, processes, and managerial or organizational know-how) that enables it to 
outperform  local  firms.  Second,  locational  factors,  such  as  opportunities  to  tap  into  local 
resources, can provide access to low-cost inputs or low-wage labor or can allow the firm to 
bypass tariffs that protect a local market from imported goods. Third, the internalization of 
global transactions may be preferable to the use of arm’s-length market transactions. In general, 
the more “imperfect” a market is, the higher the transaction costs and the greater the benefits of 
internalizing  certain  transactions  rather  than,  for  example,  establishing  a  partnership  or  joint 
venture with a local firm or simply licensing the advantageous asset to a domestic firm.  
According to this view, the genesis of FDI is the investor’s possession of some asset, 
such as technology or know-how that offers an important gain for the investing firm. This, in 
turn, suggests that FDI can play an important role in modernizing and promoting that country’s 
economic growth.
 15   However, there might also be offsetting costs to the host country.  Since 
the proprietary asset or technology provides its owner with some market power or cost advantage 
over indigenous producers, the foreign firm will seek to exploit that power.  
3.  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Host  Countries:  Effects,  Absorptive  Capacities,  and 
Complementarities 
3.1. Multinationals, Knowledge Spillovers, and Linkages: Potential Effects 
Because FDI embodies capital, technology, and know-how, there is the potential for host 
countries to benefit from spillovers. But, there are also potential tradeoffs.  
Spillover  mechanisms  include  direct  knowledge  transfer  through  partnership,  the 
opportunity to learn from the innovation and experience of foreign firms, and interaction and 
movement in labor markets. If foreign firms introduce new products or processes to the domestic 
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culminating in Dunning’s (1981) OLI framework. See the description in Antràs and Yeaple (2014).  
15  Third-world  multinationals  are  often  closer  than  first-world  multinationals  are  to  their  host  countries 
geographically, culturally, economically, and politically.  As such, their know-how and technologies (intangible 
assets) may be particularly well suited to the other emerging markets in which they invest and they may possess 
competitive advantages that enable them to circumvent or exploit local institutional voids; see Khanna and Palepu 
(2004).   8 
market,  domestic  firms  may  benefit  from  the  diffusion  of  that  technology.
16  In  some  cases, 
domestic  firms  may  benefit  solely  by  observing  foreign  firms.  In  other  cases,  technology 
diffusion may occur as domestic employees move from foreign to domestic firms.  There is also 
the potential to create linkages between foreign and domestic firms.  
One of the mechanisms by which FDI could generate positive production externalities 
depends on the flow of workers out of MNCs.
 MNCs devote more resources to labor training 
than domestic firms do. Given that a large part of this labor training is not paid for by workers 
and  constitutes  knowledge  that  is  not  completely  firm-specific,  this  constitutes  a  positive 
externality which leads to higher wages for these workers and/or higher productivity for other 
firms that subsequently hire these workers. There are also positive spillovers if workers increase 
their knowledge not through formal labor training but through on-the-job training, learning by 
doing, or learning by observing. The spillover can also take place through “spin-offs”; that is, 
when workers leave the MNC to set up their own firms and benefit from the knowledge they 
gained at the MNC. Knowledge spillovers can take place even without formal flows of workers 
out of the MNCs; one would expect knowledge about production process to diffuse from one 
firm  to  others  simply  through  the  ordinary  interactions  of  people  who  do  similar  work  for 
different companies.  
Linkages, according to Hirschman (1958), involve pecuniary externalities. In contrast to 
knowledge spillovers, pecuniary externalities take place through market transactions. If a firm 
introduces a new good, for example, there will be a positive pecuniary externality from the firm 
to consumers. The same phenomenon arises when, instead of inventing a new good, the firm is 
simply  starting  up  production  of  a  good  in  a  developing  country.    Backward  and  forward 
linkages  are  associated  with  pecuniary  externalities  in  the  production  of  inputs.  If  there  are 
transportation  costs,  when  inputs  are  produced  with  increasing  returns  and  benefits  of 
specialization, backward linkages are said to arise when a firm increases the demand for inputs 
and  this  leads  to  the  introduction  of  new  input  varieties.  Thanks  to  specialization,  the 
introduction of these inputs increases productivity for downstream producers. Forward linkages 
take place when the introduction of new inputs lowers the production cost of certain goods, 
making their production profitable for downstream producers.  
Rodríguez-Clare  (1996)  formalizes  these  channels.  For  example,  MNCs  may  create 
backward linkages and thereby lead to the production of a larger variety of intermediate goods; 
this, in turn, allows the economy to gain a comparative advantage in the production of more 
sophisticated final goods. In the end, the economy ends up with higher productivity and higher 
wages thanks to the backward and forward linkages generated by MNCs.   
According to this view of linkages, MNCs could even generate a negative backward-
linkage effect, as shown in Rodríguez-Clare (1996). For example, if MNCs behave as enclaves, 
importing all their inputs and restricting their local activities to hiring labor, demand for inputs 
decreases  as  MNCs  increase  in  importance  relative  to  domestic  firms,  which  reduces  input 
variety and specialization. This would show up as a negative horizontal externality. Note that in 
this argument, it is key that MNCs displace national firms from the market, either due to labor-
market constraints or by direct competition, as in Markusen and Venables (1999). 
The work of Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) underscores how multinational 
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16 See Caves (1996) and Blomström and Kokko (1998) for discussions of technology transfer.   9 
activity can also lead to tougher competition in product and factor markets and to the reallocation 
of resources from less-productive domestic firms to more-productive foreign firms, leading in 
turn to the exit of some domestic firms.  But another reallocation effect is that domestic firms can 
upgrade in anticipation of competition (Bao and Chen, 2013).   
Another mechanism through which FDI can affect the host economy relates to failures in 
credit markets. Razin and Sadka (2007) present a model in which some special technical or 
managerial know-how, which the authors term “intangible capital,” gives foreign direct investors 
an advantage over domestic investors in skimming the best projects. Their analysis adds a new 
twist to the gains-from-FDI argument, as benefits from this unique advantage might be shifted to 
the  domestic  country,  depending  on  the  level  of  competition  among  investors,  through  the 
acquisition price that foreign direct investors pay for those plum projects. Ownership is modeled 
as conveying earlier access to information about the firm’s productivity, which gives the owner 
planning benefits. But because this information is private to the foreign direct investor, it also 
leads to a “lemon” problem. That is, if an investor needs to sell a firm, potential buyers might 
suspect the sale to be motivated by private information about its true productivity rather than by 
a genuine need for liquidity. The local firm may then sell for less than would otherwise have 
been the case.  Razin and Sadka’s framework thus captures the tendency for FDI to be more 
stable  than  portfolio  flows,  but  also  more  illiquid.  Because  FDI  investment  is  liquidated  at 
significant  cost,  countries  prone  to  liquidity  crises  tend  to  attract  less  FDI  than  portfolio 
investment. 
3.2. Empirical Findings 
One robust finding is that MNEs tend to have higher productivity than domestic firms in 
the same sector (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Blomström and Wolff, 1994; Kokko, Zejan, and 
Tansini, 1994; Helpman et al, 2004; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009). More important, however, is 
the possibility that MNEs improve the productivity of local firms through knowledge spillovers.  
A first generation of cross-section studies generally found a positive correlation between 
foreign presence and sectoral productivity. For example, the pioneering work of Caves (1974) 
finds positive FDI spillovers in Australia, Blomström (1987) and Blomström and Wolff (1994) 
find positive effects in Mexico, and Sjöholm (1999) finds positive effects in Indonesia.  
However, looking at plant-level data in Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999)—in one 
of the most influential contributions to this literature—find that FDI raises productivity in plants 
that receive the investment while lowering that of domestically owned plants, so that the net 
effect on sector productivity is quite small. The authors interpret this result as a market-stealing 
effect whereby foreign multinational firms steal the market share of domestic firms.  
Aitken and Harrison’s paper soon spawned many empirical studies. In surveys of the 
findings, Hanson (2001), Görg and Greenaway (2004), Meyer and Sinani (2009), Pessoa (2009), 
and Bruno and Campos (2013) conclude that the effects of FDI are mostly negative or that the 
evidence for its benefits is weak at best, particularly for developing countries.  The evidence of 
positive spillover effects tends to be more favorable in developed countries. Haskel, Pereira, and 
Slaughter (2007), for example, find positive spillovers from foreign to local firms in a panel 
dataset of firms in the UK, while Görg et al. (2011) find more heterogeneous effects; Görg and 
Strobl  (2003)  find  that  foreign  presence  reduces  exit  and  encourages  entry  by  domestically   10 
owned firms in Ireland’s high-tech sector and Keller and Yeaple (2009) show strong evidence of 
positive spillovers from foreign multinational to domestic firms in the United States.  
Pessoa (2009) reviews arguments and empirical findings on the positive effects of FDI on 
host country firms and is struck most by the diversity of results, which suggests that the effects 
of FDI will depend on the host economy’s “technological congruence” and “social capability” 
and on the indigenous firms’ familiarity with a given MNC’s products and technology and/or 
capacity to adapt.  Meyer and Sinani (2009) find that local firms may gain from productivity 
spillovers from foreign investors, yet the gains vary with the local firm’s awareness of foreign 
entry and its motivation and capability to react.     
 
Paralleling  the  micro  evidence,  a  generation  of  papers,  using  cross-country  growth 
regressions, found weak support for an exogenous positive effect of FDI on economic growth 
(Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998; Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek, 2004; 
Carkovic and Levine, 2005).  Using careful econometric techniques, this literature has failed to 
find positive productivity externalities for developing countries and, in fact, has found evidence 
of negative externalities.   
 
Most empirical studies of FDI spillovers have regressed local firm productivity on FDI 
activity  within  a  particular  sector.    Although  evidence  of  horizontal  spillovers  is  elusive, 
particularly in developing countries, the empirical work at the intra-industry level might not 
capture wider spillover effects on the host economy, such as those created between MNEs and 
their suppliers. One explanation for the lack of evidence of externalities is that multinationals 
have the incentive to minimize technology leakages to competitors but would like to improve the 
productivity of suppliers. Thus, if FDI were to generate spillovers through knowledge transfer, it 
is more likely to be vertical than horizontal.  
 
With this insight in mind, a set of papers has explored positive externalities of FDI for 
local firms in upstream industries (suppliers). Here, the findings are more encouraging. In a 
widely cited paper, Javorcik (2004), using panel data for Lithuania from 1996 through 2000, 
examines  whether  the  productivity  of  domestic  firms  is  correlated  with  the  presence  of 
multinationals in downstream sectors (potential customers). Her empirical results are consistent 
with the existence of productivity externalities from FDI taking place through contacts between 
foreign  affiliates  and  their  local  suppliers  in  upstream  sectors,  but  there  is  no  indication  of 
externalities  within  the  same  industry.  Similarly,  using  a  panel  dataset  of  Indonesian 
manufacturing establishments from 1988 through 1996, Blalock and Gertler (2008, 2009) find 
evidence of positive vertical externalities. They also find that downstream FDI increases firm 
output  and  firm  value-added,  while  decreasing  prices  and  market  concentration.  Evidence 
consistent  with  inter-industry  spillovers  in  Colombia,  Romania,  and  Ireland  emerges  from 
Kugler (2006), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011), and Görg et al. (2011), respectively. Overall 
these studies find a positive correlation between the presence of multinationals in downstream 
industries and the performances of domestic suppliers.
17 
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17 See Section 4.3 for more on the role of linkages.   11 
3.3.  Complementarities  
Recent  literature  on  the  link  between  FDI  and  growth  has  focused  on 
complementarities—local  policies  and  conditions  that  are  prerequisites  for  FDI  spillovers  to 
materialize.  
At the macro level, the literature finds evidence of positive effects that are not exogenous 
but rather are conditional on local conditions and policies.  For example, Kose et al. (2009, 2010) 
list several macroeconomic and structural policies that need to be in place for countries to reap 
the benefits of financial globalization. The authors emphasize that capital account policies need 
to be seen as part of a much broader set of policies. Similarly, Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 
(2010) emphasize the relevance of complementary aspects of a trade policy regime—such as 
labor-market policies and the ease of entry and exit for firms—to the success of that policy. As 
noted by Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2009), “Appropriate development policies typically exhibit 
high degrees of complementarity.” 
 
Moran (2007) points to the role of a competitive environment (import-substitution-type 
policies). Indeed, the work of Balasubramanayam et al. (1996) finds FDI flows to be associated 
with  faster  growth  in  countries  with  outward-oriented  trade  policies.  Many  of  the  first-  and 
second-generation  panel  studies  on  FDI  and  growth,  which  found  primarily  orthogonal  or 
negative relationships, were conducted in countries—such as India, Morocco, and Venezuela—
with inward-oriented policies. The results in Aitken and Harrison (1999)—that the overall effect 
of foreign investment in Venezuela is small—are based on data from 1976 to 1989, a period 
during  which  Venezuela  pursued  inward-oriented  policies.    Moran  (2007)  concludes  that 
“manufacturing FDI is more likely to make a positive contribution to a national income under 
reasonable competitive conditions.” 
 
Borensztein et al. (1998), using a dataset of FDI flows from industrialized countries to 69 
developing countries, find that FDI is an important vehicle for transferring technology and higher 
growth only when the host country has a minimum threshold of human capital. Likewise, Xu 
(2000) uses data on U.S. MNEs and finds that (a) a country needs to have reached a minimum 
human capital threshold in order to benefit from the technology transfer from MNEs and (b) 
most  developing  countries  do  not  meet  this  threshold.  These  results  suggest  that  FDI  is  an 
important vehicle for the transfer of technology, that there are strong complementarities between 
FDI and human capital, and that FDI is more productive than domestic investment only when the 
host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital. 
 
In a cross-country analysis, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) examine 
the intermediary role played by local financial institutions in channeling the contributions of FDI 
to economic growth.
 
In particular, they argue that the lack of development of local financial 
markets can limit the economy’s ability to take advantage of potential FDI spillovers. Their 
results show that FDI does not exert a robust positive impact on growth on its own. However, 
when the authors include the interaction term, it turns out to be positive and significant at one 
percent  for  various  specifications  of  the  financial  sector.  Thus,  the  authors  find  convincing 
evidence that a country needs a strong financial sector to reap the positive benefits of FDI. 
 
Alfaro and Charlton (2013) provide industry-level evidence by using  data for OECD   12 
countries and showing that the relation between FDI and growth is stronger for industries more 
reliant on external finance. These results, apart from being consistent with the existing macro 
literature and the hypothesized benefits of FDI, are further evidence of important cross-industry 
differences  in  the  effects  of  FDI.    Hermes  and  Lensink  (2003)  and  Durham  (2004)  provide 
further evidence that a country with a well-developed financial market gains significantly from 
FDI.  Prasad,  Rajan,  and  Subramanian  (2007),  also  focusing  on  correlations,  find  that  for 
financially dependent industries in countries with weaker financial systems, foreign capital does 
not contribute to growth. 
 
Bruno and Campos (2013) also state that FDI effects are conditional, depending at the 
macro level on minimum levels of human capital or financial development and at the micro level 
on the type of linkage (forwards, backwards, or horizontal).  
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2009) examine whether the financial-markets channel 
through which FDI is beneficial for growth operates through factor accumulation or through total 
factor productivity (TFP). The authors find that if FDI has an effect on growth, it does not seem 
to operate via the accumulation of physical or human capital, even when their analysis considers 
threshold and interaction effects with the absorptive capacities of the economy.  Instead, the 
interaction of FDI with strong financial development affects growth through gains in TFP. 
 
The importance of well-functioning financial institutions to economic development has 
been  extensively  discussed  in  the  literature.    Researchers  have  shown  that  well-functioning 
financial markets, by lowering transaction costs, ensure that capital is allocated to the projects 
that yield the highest returns and therefore enhance growth rates.
18 
Furthermore, as McKinnon 
(1973)  states,  the  development  of  capital  markets  is  “necessary  and  sufficient”  to  foster  the 
“adoption of best-practice technologies and learning by doing.” In other words, if limited access 
to  credit  markets  restricts  entrepreneurial  development  and  if  entrepreneurship  encourages 
assimilation of best technological practices made available by FDI, then the absence of well-
developed financial markets limits the potential for positive FDI externalities. Although some 
local firms might be able to finance new requirements with internal financing, the greater the gap 
in technological knowledge between their current practices and new technologies, the greater the 
need for external finance, which is restricted in most cases to domestic sources. 
 
  At the micro level, other researchers have found causal but indirect results emphasizing 
the complementarity of FDI and financial development. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009a) find 
that, among Czech firms, those supplying multinationals tend to be less liquidity-constrained 
than  others.  This  micro  evidence  further  suggests  that,  in  the  absence  of  well-functioning 
financial markets, local firms may find it difficult to start business relations with MNEs and reap 
the benefits of productivity spillovers. This mechanism is consistent with the growth effects 
found in Liu (2008) and with the formalization in Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek 
(2010). 
 
Most barriers to foreign investment today affect services rather than goods. While there is 
considerable empirical evidence on the impact of FDI on manufacturing productivity, a nascent 
empirical literature studies the effects of services liberalization on manufacturing productivity.  
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Arnold  et  al.  (2006)  find  a  positive  relationship  between  service  sector  reform  and  the 
productivity  of  domestic  firms  in  downstream  manufacturing  sectors.  Arnold,  Javorcik,  and 
Mattoo (2008) find the same effect in India. The effects and complementarities of reducing 
barriers to services and goods remain an important topic for future research. 
 
Overall,  the  literature  on  complementarities  has  found  that  some  countries  lack  the 
preconditions to reap the potential benefits of FDI, which may help explain the ambiguity in the 
findings on the relationship between FDI and growth.  Spillovers from foreign to domestic firms 
depend on the domestic firms’ ability to respond successfully to new entrants, new technology, 
and new competition. That success is, to some extent, determined by local characteristics such as 
the level of human capital and the development of the local financial markets as well as by the 
overall institutional level of the country. Weaknesses in these areas may reduce the capacity of 
domestic industries to absorb new technologies and respond to the challenges and opportunities 
presented by foreign entrants. Variation in such “absorptive capacities” between countries (and 
between industries within countries) is a promising line of research that may produce a synthesis 
of the current literature’s conflicting results.  
4. Channels, Mechanisms, and Sources of Differences 
Empirical studies have focused on finding indirect evidence of externalities by exploring 
whether increases in MNE presence are associated with increases in local firms’ productivity.  
However, it is important to investigate the channels, mechanisms, and sources of differential 
effects in order to establish the robustness of these findings, not to mention devising appropriate 
policy interventions to maximize the benefits from FDI. 
4.1. Factor Markets 
FDI could contribute to a host country’s development via factor accumulation; that is, by 
increasing the country’s stock of physical and/or human capital. The foreign capital injected into 
the  host  economy  can  contribute  to  physical  capital  formation,  while  employee  training  can 
contribute to skill development. But here, too, the empirical evidence shows that neither of these 
benefits can be presumed.  
 
Labor    A  few  studies  have  evaluated  the  factor-market  effects  of  multinational 
production.  In terms of human capital, FDI can increase national welfare if MNEs pay higher 
wages than domestic firms do.  As mentioned above, one robust finding is that the productivity 
of  MNEs  tends  to  be  higher  than  that  of  domestic  firms  in  the  same  sector.    Under  these 
circumstances, FDI would lead to a higher GDP. But if MNEs paid market wages, the increased 
GDP would be completely captured by the MNEs, with no increase in national welfare.  
 
  There is ample evidence, however, that MNEs do pay above-market wages (Blomström, 
1983; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996; Girma, Greenaway, and 
Wakelin, 1999; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001; Sjöholm and Lipsey, 2006). It is very likely, then, 
that the fruits of their higher productivity are shared with nationals, which could, in turn, justify 
government incentives for MNEs.   
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Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) investigate the impact of foreign-owned plants on 
the wages paid by domestically owned establishments in Mexico and Venezuela. Their analysis 
suggests  an  increase  in  industry  wages—especially  for  skilled  workers—due  to  foreign 
multinational  production.  Similarly,  Feenstra  and  Hanson  (1997)  find  that  a  higher  level  of 
maquiladora activity leads to a higher share of total wages going to skilled (nonproduction) 
workers in Mexico, a result they interpret as increased demand for skilled labor from foreign 
multinational firms. 
 
Harrison  and  Rodríguez-Clare  (2010),  reviewing  the  literature  on  FDI  and  wages, 
conclude that, after adjusting for firm and worker characteristics, foreign firms pay a small wage 
premium that is between 5 and 10 percent. 
 
Furthermore, there is ample anecdotal evidence that MNEs undertake substantial efforts 
to educate local workers and that they offer more training to technical workers and managers 
than  local  firms  do.
19 
In  some  cases,  MNEs  also  enter  into  training  cooperation  with  local 
institutions. For example, Intel and Shell-BP have made contributions to local universities in 
Costa  Rica  and  Nigeria,  respectively;  in  Singapore,  the  Economic  Development  Board  has 
collaborated with MNEs to establish and improve training centers.
20 
However, in an empirical 
analysis of a panel of countries, te Velde and Xenogiani (2007) find that FDI enhances skill 
development (particularly secondary and tertiary enrollment) only in countries that are already 
relatively well endowed with skills. The finding that FDI’s contribution to skill development is 
conditional  on  a  threshold  of  human  capital  illustrates  the  emerging  understanding  of  the 
importance of complementarities, which we discussed in the previous section. 
 
Financial markets  There is an emerging literature on the effect of FDI on local capital 
markets.  One  reason  policy  makers  give  for  promoting  foreign  investment  in  developing 
countries is the scarcity of capital for new investment. This argument is based on the assumption 
that  foreign  investors  provide  additional  capital  when  they  set  up  new  enterprises  in  local 
markets. However, Kindleberger (1969), Graham and Krugman (1995), and Lipsey (2002) show 
that investors do not transfer their entire investment upon taking control of a foreign company; 
instead,  they  tend  to  finance  an  important  share  of  their  investment  in  the  local  market.
21 
Furthermore, faced with rising exchange-rate volatility, many foreign investors have found ways 
to hedge by borrowing on local capital markets. If foreign firms borrow heavily from local 
banks,  instead  of  bringing  scarce  capital  from  abroad,  they  may  exacerbate  domestic  firms’ 
financing constraints by crowding them out of domestic capital markets. 
 
Harrison  and  McMillan  (2003)  and  Harrison,  Love,  and  McMillan  (2004)  test  that 
possibility. Harrison and McMillan (2003) analyze the behavior of mostly French multinationals 
operating in Côte d’Ivoire, finding not only that domestic firms are more credit-constrained than 
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19 See Fosfuri, Motta, and Ronde (2001) and the discussions in Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare (2004) and Alfaro, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2009). 
20 World Bank (1995), Spar (1998), and Larraín, López, and Rodríguez-Clare (2000). 
21 As mentioned above, the industrial organization literature suggests that firms engage in FDI not because of 
differences in the cost of capital but because certain assets are worth more under foreign control than under local 
control. If the lower cost of capital were the only advantage a foreign firm had over domestic firms, it would remain 
unexplained why a foreign investor would endure the troubles of operating a firm in a different political, legal, and 
cultural environment rather than simply making a portfolio investment.    15 
foreign  firms,  but  also  that  borrowing  by  foreign  firms  exacerbates  the  credit  constraints  of 
domestic firms. Harrison, Love, and McMillan (2004), using company-level data across a panel 
of  countries,  get  results  suggesting  that,  in  a  country  such  as  Côte  d’Ivoire,  with  numerous 
market  imperfections  and  with  credit  access  rationed  due  to  interest-rate  ceilings,  foreign 
investors did indeed crowd domestic enterprises out of local credit markets.  In their panel of 
countries,  however,  they  found  that  foreign  investors  also  tended  to  crowd  in  domestic 
enterprises;  that  is,  as  foreign  investment  increased,  the  amount  of  credit  available  to 
domestically owned firms actually rose.   Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) argue that these 
contrasting results point to policy complementarities, such the aforementioned complementarities 
between FDI and local financial markets (see Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010).   In a country with 
credit-market  imperfections,  such  as  Côte  d’Ivoire,  FDI  exacerbated  the  imperfections.  The 
importance of such complementarities is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2. Selection, Competition, and Reallocation 
The  selection  decisions  of  multinational  firms  choosing  to  invest  in  high-growth 
countries/sectors/companies  suggest  that  the  higher  the  productivity  of  the  host  country,  the 
greater  the  multinational  activity  there.  In  contrast,  knowledge  spillovers  imply  that 
multinational  activity  causes  (rather  than  being  caused  by)  higher  aggregate  domestic 
productivity. Greater multinational activity can also lead to tougher competition in product and 
factor markets and to the reallocation of resources from less-productive domestic firms to more-
productive foreign firms, leading to the exit of some domestic firms. Here again, multinational 
activity appears as the cause (not the result) of higher aggregate domestic productivity. The 
effects  of  the  latter  two  mechanisms  are  also  countervailing:    Tougher  selection  means  a 
contraction of domestic production while technology spillovers represent positive externalities. 
 
Recent studies by Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe et al. (2011) account for the 
endogenous acquisition decisions of foreign multinational firms and find that those firms acquire 
the  best-performing  domestic  firms.  These  studies  also  show,  even  after  addressing  the 
acquisition  decisions,  that  foreign  ownership  leads  to  significant  productivity  spillovers  in 
acquired plants,. Fons-Rosen et al. (2013), on the other hand, find little evidence of spillover. 
 
Using a propensity score combined with difference-in-differences analysis to control for 
both  nonrandom  sampling  and  changes  in  observables/unobservables,  Arnold  and  Javorcik 
(2009) find that Indonesian manufacturing plants that become foreign-owned (a) invest more in 
fixed  assets—particularly  in  machinery—than  domestically  owned  firms  with  similar 
characteristics  do  and  (b)  increase  both  the  import-intensity  of  their  inputs  and  the  export-
intensity  of  their  output.  Interestingly,  the  authors  also  find  that  these  plants  implement 
organizational changes that improve worker performance.  Such findings can help explain the 
robust relationship between foreign ownership and plant TFP. The organization of multinational 
firms will be discussed in the next section, “Multinationals and Organization.” 
 
While these results offer important insight into how FDI drives higher TFP in the plants 
receiving it—that is, at the micro level—it is another exercise altogether to shed light on the 
mechanism by which FDI generates macro-level growth for the host country.   
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One  approach  to  this  question  can  be  understood  in  light  of  new  trade  theories  that 
emphasize firm heterogeneity, as illustrated by Melitz (2003). In his model, gains from trade 
occur through reallocation of market share from less-productive to more-productive firms. This 
cannot take place, however, when there are barriers to firm exit and expansion, confirming the 
importance of FDI being accompanied by complementary policies such as credit availability and 
low barriers to entry/exit and to reallocation of factors. 
 
In order to understand the mechanisms by which an economy responds to multinational 
production, to evaluate the effect of foreign investment, and to set the corresponding economic 
policies,  we  need  to  distinguish  between  market  reallocation  and  knowledge  spillover.
22  If 
knowledge spillover is the primary source of productivity gains, special treatment for foreign 
firms—often in the form of tax breaks and financial incentives—may be justified and sufficient. 
But if productivity gains also arise from market reallocation, it would be important to improve 
domestic market conditions—including labor supply and credit access—and to eliminate barriers 
to such reallocation.  
While  there  has  been  extensive  research  on  the  knowledge  spillover  effect  of 
multinational firms, there has been little on the role of market reallocation in the aggregate 
impact of multinational production and on the different ways in which market reallocation and 
knowledge spillover influence the potential gains from multinational competition.  Evidence on 
the domestic selection effect of multinational production is limited. Analysis that disentangles 
the relative importance of knowledge spillovers and selection is even scarcer.     
Alfaro and Chen (2013) disentangle the roles of selection and knowledge spillover in 
determining  the  aggregate  impact  of  multinational  production  on  host-country  productivity.  
Using a micro theoretical foundation that captures simultaneously these two distinct aspects of 
multinational production, the paper develops an empirical strategy to distinguish their relative 
importance  while  accounting  for  the  self-selection  of  multinational  firms.  It  also  provides  a 
structural framework with which to quantify the magnitude of productivity gains associated with 
each effect and to perform counterfactual analysis. The paper’s analysis offers new evidence on 
the  market  reallocation  effect  of  FDI  and  on  the  cross-country  heterogeneity  in  gains  from 
openness to multinational production.
23 These results suggest that sensible policy should aim to 
facilitate  gains  from  competition  and  the  reallocation  of  resources  by  improving  domestic 
conditions—including  credit  access  and  labor  supply  (particularly  skilled  labor)—while 
eliminating regulatory barriers. 
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22 Although the role of market reallocation is underemphasized in evaluating gains from multinational production, 
its role is well established in assessing the productivity gains from trade liberalization; see Melitz and Redding 
(forthcoming) for a recent overview. 
23 Ramondo (2009), using a panel of domestic and foreign plants in the Chilean manufacturing sector, finds the entry 
of foreign plants to be negatively correlated with the market shares of domestic incumbents but positively correlated 
with their productivity. Kosová (2010), analyzing exit and sales growth of domestic firms in the Czech Republic, 
finds evidence consistent with crowding out and technology spillovers. 
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4.3. Linkages   
Another promising inquiry into the growth-inducing mechanism of FDI has been the 
effort to uncover the potential for spillovers by formalizing whether and how foreign-owned 
firms generate meaningful linkages to domestic firms, both intra-industry (horizontal) and inter-
industry (vertical).  As discussed above, since MNEs are motivated to provide technological 
spillover to their suppliers but not to their competitors, most of the recent literature has focused 
on the mechanism for vertical, rather than horizontal, linkages.   
 
An  important  question  is  whether  all  vertical  (supply)  relations  have  the  potential  to 
develop  into  positive  linkages  and  to  generate  positive  FDI  spillovers.    The  cherry-picking 
behavior  of  many  foreign  firms  with  respect  to  local  firms  that  can  already  supply  goods 
(Javorcik  and  Spatareanu,  2005)  is  not  associated  with  potential  positive  externalities.  That 
foreign  firms  seem  to  help  some  suppliers  improve  their  performance  again  implies  an 
externality only if these benefits are not fully internalized by the foreign firm.  
 
Interviews with suppliers and MNEs in Costa Rica revealed few cases in which there had 
clearly  been  a  positive  technology  transfer  from  an  MNE  to  a  supplier  (see  Alfaro  and 
Rodríguez-Clare,  2004).  The  interviews  also  revealed  that  MNEs  often  lacked  technical 
knowledge about the production processes of the inputs they used. When they did have such 
knowledge, it tended to be about production processes for sophisticated inputs that, because they 
were  unlikely  to  be  supplied  by  local  firms,  were  usually  sourced  from  highly  specialized 
international suppliers. While the interviews provided no evidence of knowledge spillovers via 
technology transfer, they did reveal many instances in which local firms had decided to upgrade 
their production processes in order to become MNE suppliers. 
 
Given the ambiguity of this survey data, an integrated approach that links theory and 
evidence  is  needed  to  flush  out  the  potential  for  spillover  effects.  Theoretical  work  by 
Rodríguez-Clare  (1996)  suggests  that  under  certain  conditions  (specialization  advantage, 
increasing returns, and high transportation costs), increased demand for specialized inputs would 
lead to the local production of new types of these inputs, generating positive externalities for 
other  domestic  firms  that  use  them.  According  to  this  view  of  linkages,  MNEs  could  even 
generate a negative backward-linkage effect. If, for example, they were to behave as enclaves, 
importing  all  their  inputs  and  restricting  their  local  activities  to  hiring  labor,  demand  for 
domestic inputs might decrease as the MNEs increased in importance relative to domestic firms, 
leading  to  a  reduction  in  input  variety  and  specialization  (see  also  Markusen  and  Venables, 
1999). 
 
However, as discussed in Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare (2004), it is important to consider 
the model’s key assumptions and how violation of these assumptions might affect the potential 
for multinationals to create linkages. One important assumption is that the intermediate inputs 
are nontradable and, by extension, that the input-sourcing behaviors of domestic and foreign-
owned plants are identical. Were goods perfectly tradable—that is, were there no transportation 
costs—it would not make sense to talk about a firm introducing a good to a developing country. 
Given demand, all existing goods would automatically be available everywhere. Only demand 
for  nontradable  inputs  generates  meaningful  linkages.  Furthermore,  given  the  higher  import-  18 
intensity of the inputs of foreign-owned firms, the assumption of nontradability is evidently 
overly restrictive.   
 
As mentioned in Barrios, Görg, and Strobl (2011), the assumption of identical input-
sourcing behavior “goes against the very premise underlying the search for spillovers arising 
from FDI, namely that foreign multinationals are different [from] their domestic counterparts in 
production organization mode.”
24  Arnold and Javorcik (2009) provide evidence that firms that 
become  foreign-owned  import  a  larger  share  of  their  inputs  than  they  would  have  had  they 
remained domestically owned.  Ideally, researchers would take into account only purchases of 
nontradable inputs, but data constraints usually make such precision impossible.  
 
A  second  caveat  is  that  only  demand  for  intermediate  goods  that  exhibit  increasing 
returns (as opposed, for example, to constant returns to scale) entails linkages. A third caveat is 
that demand for inputs with a low elasticity of substitution generates linkages with a stronger 
effect on productivity than does demand for inputs that have good substitutes. A fourth caveat is 
that multinationals seem to hire more skilled workers than domestic firms do.Positive linkage 
effects by multinationals might be less likely in the face of greater competition between MNEs 
and domestic firms for scarce skilled labor.  
With these four caveats in mind, how do we set out to measure such linkages?  The 
traditional interpretation of a finding frequently reported in the empirical literature—that the 
share of inputs bought domestically is lower for MNEs than for local firms (Barry and Bradley, 
1997; Görg and Ruane, 2001)—has been that MNEs generate fewer linkages than domestic firms 
do.  Theory,  however,  suggests  that  the  share  of  inputs  bought  domestically  is  not  a  valid 
indicator of the linkages MNEs can generate.  Barrios, Görg, and Strobl (2011) show that when 
measuring whether MNEs generate positive linkages, the results depend heavily on the choice of 
the backward-linkage measure.  The authors also discuss in detail the assumptions underpinning 
the prior literature’s traditional measure of linkages. A more appropriate measure is the ratio of 
the value of inputs bought domestically to the number of workers hired by the firm, which can 
also be defined as the share of inputs sourced domestically times intensity (inputs per worker). 
While MNEs may have a lower share (as they are more likely to import inputs), they may also be 
likely to have higher intensity coefficients. 
 
Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare (2004) found, consistent with earlier evidence, that the share 
of inputs sourced domestically was lower for foreign firms than for domestic firms in Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, but also that the intensity coefficient for foreign firms was higher. 
The linkage coefficient was higher for foreign firms in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, whereas in 
Mexico the authors could not reject the hypothesis that foreign and domestic firms have similar 
linkage potential. Another important result was that entrant foreign firms tended to have a lower 
linkage coefficient, but that the linkage tended to increase over time, highlighting the importance 
of the duration of study (as well as of the timing, since studies closer to liberalization efforts are 
more likely to produce negative results). 
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24 See also Grima, Grog and Pisu (2008) and Gorg an Seric (2013).   19 
Interestingly, a positive backward-linkage effect does not necessarily imply a positive 
externality  from  MNEs  to  suppliers.  Rather,  such  a  positive  linkage  effect  should  lead  to  a 
positive externality from MNEs to other firms in the same industry; that is, a positive horizontal 
externality.    In  a  theoretical  framework,  Alfaro,  Chanda,  Kalemli-Ozcan,  and  Sayek  (2010) 
elucidate this idea by developing a model in which the presence of positive linkages depends on 
the extent of the local financial sector’s development. They model a small open economy in 
which final goods production is carried out by foreign and domestic firms which compete for 
skilled labor, unskilled labor, and intermediate products. To operate a firm in the intermediate 
goods  sector,  an  entrepreneur  must  develop  a  new  variety  of  intermediate  good,  a  task  that 
requires upfront capital investment. The more developed the local financial markets, the easier it 
is for credit-constrained entrepreneurs to start their own firms.
25 The increase in the variety of 
intermediate goods leads to positive spillovers to the final goods sector. As a result, financial 
markets  allow  the  backward  linkages  between  foreign  and  domestic  firms  to  turn  into  FDI 
spillovers. Crucially, though, this model implies that spillovers should be horizontal rather than 
vertical. 
 
However, the evidence of horizontal spillovers from FDI has remained elusive. Iršová 
(2013), in a meta-analysis of the literature, finds that, on average, horizontal spillovers are zero.
26   
Why do we not observe a positive externality from MNEs to other firms in the same industry? 
Quality  of  data,  errors  in  the  measurement  of  productivity,  and  endogeneity  issues  in  the 
presence of multinationals are all possible answers to this puzzle. But another is that there might 
be  some  negative  horizontal  externality  that  offsets  the  positive  one;  for  example,  the 
competition effect occasioned by the entry of MNEs, as argued by Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
and shown in Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2010) and Alfaro and Chen (2013). 
Iršová (2013), too, finds this effect, but also finds that the sign and magnitude of horizontal 
spillover depend systematically on the characteristics of the domestic economy and the foreign 
investors.  
 
An important challenge for the literature is therefore to control for competition effects. 
Data  availability  imposes  a  significant  restriction  on  efforts  to  address  this  issue  through 
econometric work, particularly in developing countries. In some recent work, Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2010) combine theory and a calibration approach to formalize the 
mechanism through which the trickle-down effect of FDI via backward linkages depends on hthe 
level  of  local  conditions—including  market  structure,  financial  markets,  and  competition  for 
skilled and unskilled labor—and to quantify the properties of the model for realistic parameters. 
 
Of course, externalities and spillovers are, by their very nature, hard to measure. Quality 
upgrades, worker training, and improvements in the business environment and in organizational 
practices are some of the factors that can also have positive effects on the host economy.  In 
addition, MNEs may cluster worldwide to benefit from their interaction. Firms that agglomerated 
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25 Hirschman (1958) argues that linkage effects are realized when one industry may facilitate the development of 
another by easing conditions of production, thereby setting the pace for further rapid industrialization. He also 
argues  that  in  the  absence  of  linkages,  foreign  investments  could  have  limited  or  even  negative  effects  on  an 
economy (the so-called enclave economies). 
26  In  an  earlier  meta-analysis,  Havranek  and  Iršová  (2011)  examine  3,626  estimates  of  spillovers  and  find  the 
average spillover to be economically significant for suppliers and statistically significant but small for buyers.   20 
in, for example, Silicon Valley and Detroit now have subsidiary plants clustering in Bangalore 
and Slovakia, known respectively as the Silicon Valley of India and the Detroit of the East.   
 
The  agglomeration  of  economic  activity,  as  long  recognized  by  regional  and  urban 
economists and economic historians, is one of the salient features of economic development. An 
extensive body of research examines the distribution of population and production across space 
and  the  economic  characteristics  and  effects  of  spatial  concentrations.  Understanding  the 
emerging spatial concentrations of multinational production around the world and the driving 
forces behind these new concentrations in comparison to those of their domestic counterparts is 
crucial for designing and improving policies.  
 
  Alfaro and Chen (2014) investigate the patterns and determinants of the global economic 
geography  of  multinational  firms.    The  authors’  analysis  shows  that  the  emerging  offshore 
clusters of multinationals are not a simple reflection of domestic industrial clusters. That is, 
within a host country, multinationals follow different agglomeration patterns than their domestic 
counterparts  do.    The  location  decisions  of  MNEs  reflect  location  fundamentals,  including 
market access (to avoid trade costs) and comparative advantage (to seek abundant factors with 
lower costs) but also reflect agglomeration economies.  Agglomeration economies stress the 
benefits of geographic proximity between firms, including lower transport costs between input 
suppliers  and  final  good  producers  (vertical  linkages),  labor-market  and  capital-good-market 
externalities reflecting MNEs’ high capital- and innovation-intensity, and technology diffusion. 
In  addition,  multinational  entrants  display  stronger  propensities  to  cluster  with  incumbent 
multinationals than with incumbent local plants.   Again, this is especially the case when capital-
good-market externalities and technology diffusion benefits are strong. 
4.4. The Role of Institutions 
North (1995) describes institutions as the rules of the game in a society, defining them 
more formally as the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social 
interaction.  There  is  an  important  distinction  between  policies  and  institutions:    Policies  are 
choices made within a political and social structure; that is, within a set of institutions. 
 
Institutions  consist  of  both  informal  constraints,  such  as  traditions  and  customs,  and 
formal  rules,  such  as  constitutions,  laws,  and  property  rights.  They  provide  the  incentive 
structure  of  an  economy.  The  early  work  by  North  (1981)  and  later  contributions  such  as 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that a society’s social, 
legal,  and  political  institutions  shape  its  economic  performance.  For  example,  they  effect 
investment decisions by protecting the property rights of entrepreneurs against the government 
and  other  segments  of  society  and  by  preventing  elites  from  blocking  the  adoption  of  new 
technologies.  In  general,  weak  property  rights  due  to  poor  institutions  can  lead  to  lack  of 
productive capacities or to uncertainty in returns.  
 
The  relation  between  institutions  and  capital  flows—foreign  direct  investment,  in 
particular—can be one channel through which institutions promote growth via capital formation 
and spillovers.   Bénassy-Quéré,  Coupet, and Mayer (2007) list several reasons why the quality 
of institutions may matter for attracting FDI.   Good institutions may attract foreign investors 
while  weak  institutions,  meanwhile,  can  saddle  investors  with  additional  costs,  such  as   21 
corruption (Wei, 2000). Given FDI’s high sunk costs, it is especially vulnerable to uncertainty, 
including  the  uncertainty  stemming  from  bureaucratic  inefficiency,  policy  reversals,  weak 
enforcement of property rights, and a weak legal system in general. Antras, Desai and Foley 
(2009) demonstrate that weak investor protections limit the scale of multinational firm activity. 
 
Alfaro et al. (2007, 2008) use an empirical framework to examine different explanations 
for the lack of flows of capital from rich countries to poor ones—the Lucas paradox. The authors 
find  evidence  that  institutional  quality  is  the  most  important  variable  explaining  the  lack  of 
flows—particularly of FDI—to poor countries. The study considers reverse causality, examines 
the  determinants  of  the  volatility  of  capital  flows,  and  investigates  whether  institutions  and 
policies play a role in reducing the instability in international financial markets. The evidence 
suggests  that  both  low  institutional  quality  and  bad  policies—bad  monetary  policies,  in 
particular—help explain the long-run volatility of capital flows. 
 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer (2007) implement cross-section estimations, panel 
data estimation, and control for the correlation between institutions and GDP per capita and for 
endogeneity  of  institutions.    The  authors  find  a  wide  range  of  institutions  (bureaucracy, 
corruption,  transparency,  and  legal  institutions)  that  matter  for  inward  FDI  independently  of 
GDP per capita. The institutional proximity of the origin and host countries also matters, but the 
authors find little impact of institutions in the origin country.  Buchanan, Li, and Rishi (2012) 
also find a positive relation between institutional quality and FDI and a negative relation between 
institutional  quality  and  volatility.  As  the  authors  note,  these  results  suggest  that  efforts  to 
improve  institutions  may  help  developing  countries  receive  more  FDI,  independently  of  the 
indirect impact of higher GDP per capita. 
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4.5. FDI, Volatility, and Crises 
It  is  sometimes  argued  that  FDI  is  inherently  less  volatile  than  portfolio  investment. 
However, several studies find FDI to have a significant negative effect on plant survival and 
stability.  In  addition,  the  footloose  nature  of  MNEs  makes  them  more  volatile  than  purely 
domestic firms. Görg and Strobl (2003), for example, find Irish establishments with foreign 
ownership to be more likely than indigenous plants to exit the market, controlling for other plant- 
and industry-specific characteristics. Gibson and Harris (1996) and Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) 
reach  similar  conclusions  for  New  Zealand  and  Indonesia,  respectively.  Bernard  and  Jensen 
(2007) focus on domestic multinationals in the U.S. and find them to be more likely than purely 
domestic U.S. firms to shut down home-country plants. 
 
Relatively few studies have examined how multinationals respond to a crisis compared to 
how local firms do and how the performance of an MNE’s establishment is linked across the 
countries  in  which  it  operates.  Alvarez  and  Görg  (2007),  investigating  the  response  of 
multinational and domestic firms to an economic downturn in Chile, find that multinationals 
reacted to the economic crisis no differently than domestic firms did.  Desai, Foley, and Forbes 
(2008),  evaluating  the  response  of  multinational  and  local  firms  (outside  the  U.S.)  to  sharp 
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27 See also Nunnenkamp (2004) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2014)   22 
currency depreciations, find that sales, assets, and investment increase significantly more for 
U.S. multinational affiliates than for local firms.  
 
While these studies focus on regional economic slowdowns and currency depreciations, 
Alfaro and Chen (2012) nvestigate the micro responses to a crisis by examining differences in 
establishments’ performance during the recent global financial meltdown, with an emphasis on 
how foreign ownership affected resilience to negative shocks.  The authors look at the global 
scope and considerable heterogeneity of that crisis to explain the role of FDI in microeconomic 
performance. To disentangle the effects of foreign ownership from other effects, the authors use 
a worldwide panel dataset of detailed information on the industry, location, and operations of 
more than 12 million establishments. To control for observable and unobservable differences 
between foreign subsidiaries and local establishments, they match each foreign subsidiary with a 
local establishment with similar characteristics and operating in the same country and industry. 
The  effect  of  foreign  ownership  is  thus  inferred  from  the  divergence  in  performance.    The 
authors explore the time variation of the data and separately consider non-crisis (2005-2007) and 
crisis (2007-2008) periods. Comparing the effect of foreign ownership during the crisis with its 
effect in non-crisis years makes it possible to identify the role of production and financial links in 
increasing the resilience of foreign subsidiaries to negative demand and financial shocks. 
 
The findings suggest that, on average, foreign subsidiaries responded better to the global 
financial crisis than local control plants with similar economic characteristics did. But while 
foreign  ownership  had  a  pronounced  advantage  during  the  crisis,  it  did  not  during  normal 
economic periods. Foreign subsidiaries with stronger vertical production links with their parent 
firms  performed  better  than  the  control  establishments  during  the  crisis,  while  those  with 
horizontal links did not. Again, this pattern is not observed in non-crisis years.  Similarly, foreign 
subsidiaries operating in industries with greater intra-firm financial links had a greater advantage 
over local controls only during the crisis period, and especially in host countries with worsened 
credit conditions. 
 
These findings have important implications for the academic and policy debates on the role 
of foreign direct investment. In many countries, there are growing concerns that FDI is more 
volatile than domestic investment, leading to greater vulnerabilities—especially during crises. 
The analysis in Alfaro and Chen (2012) suggests that, while multinationals’ footloose behavior 
might  lead  to  greater  volatility,  vertical  production  and  financial  links  between  foreign 
subsidiaries and parent firms could alleviate the impact of a crisis on a host country. 
 
4.6. Multinationals and Organization 
Despite the extensive recent theoretical and empirical literature, as noted by Melitz and 
Redding (forthcoming), firm productivity remains largely a black box.  Empirical research on the 
roles  of  technology  adoption,  innovation,  management  practice,  firm  organization,  and  the 
feedback loop from foreign direct investment is still scare.   
 
A small number of recent papers explore where multinational firms locate innovation 
activity and how this affects their productivity. Studies on German and British enterprises have 
shown that companies with relatively strong R&D ties with the United States, as measured by the   23 
share of patents with inventors residing in the U.S., benefit more from R&D growth in the U.S. 
than less-well-connected competitors do. For UK-based companies, knowledge spillovers from 
foreign R&D investment to domestic corporations result in a productivity increase of 5 percent 
on  average  (Griffith  et  al.,  2006),  while  German  companies  enjoy  a  15-percent  productivity 
increase (Harhoff et al., 2012). The drawback of this literature is that it captures only patent 
activities and hence only a small fraction of total innovation activity. Furthermore, patent data do 
not make clear where the innovation activity actually took place. 
An emerging literature aims to understand the role of management practices in inter-firm 
and inter-country productivity differences, which are widely known to be enormous (Caselli, 
2005; Syverson, 2011).  Researchers have attempted to explain why some countries and some 
firms within these countries can use their factors of production more efficiently and extract more 
output than other countries and firms do. The traditional approach to this puzzling question has 
been to explore the slow diffusion of technology, on the assumption that differentials are due to 
“hard” technological innovations as embodied in patents or to the adoption of new advanced 
equipment. A growing body of research focuses instead on the misallocation of resources across 
plants (Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk, 2009; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). That is, differences are a 
matter not only of the level of factor accumulation, but also of how these factors are allocated 
across production units.  Echoing these studies, Alfaro and Chen (2013) suggest that reallocation 
of capital and labor as a result of increased multinational production could lead to important 
productivity gains.  
 
Yet another explanation of productivity differences, studied more recently using firm-
level data, is that they reflect variations in management practices.  Recent work by Bloom et al. 
(2013), for example, using a survey of management practices in over 30,000 plants across the 
U.S., finds that more structured management practices are associated with greater productivity 
and profitability, higher rates of innovation, and faster employment growth.  Multinational firms 
tend to have more structured management practices.   
 
Bloom  and  van  Reenen  (2010)  find  that  management  practices  vary  widely  across 
countries,  industries,  and  firms.    They  find  not  only  that  multinationals  are  generally  better 
managed  in  every  country  but  also  that  multinationals  transplant  their  management  styles 
abroad.
28 The authors also find that export firms are better managed than non-exporters and that 
exporting is dominated by multinationals.  Finally, they find that, in general, competition tends to 
improve management practices via selection, the exit of badly managed firms, and innovation.   
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28 In a related paper, Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2012) examine the differences in IT-related productivity 
between  establishments  owned  by  U.S.  multinationals  and  establishments  that  either  are  owned  by  non-U.S. 
multinationals or are purely (non-U.S.) domestic. The authors find that foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals 
appear  to  obtain  higher  productivity  from  their  IT  capital  than  domestic  firms  and  affiliates  of  non-U.S. 
multinationals do and are also more IT-intensive. This is true in both a UK establishment-level dataset and in a 
European  firm-level  dataset.    The  authors  also  show  that  American  firms  have  higher  scores  on  “people 
management” practices, defined in terms of promotion, reward, hiring, and firing practices.    24 
4.7.  Heterogeneity 
 
Of course, the quality of foreign direct investment may be affected by any number of 
project and industry characteristics such as the mode of entry (greenfield versus M&A) and the 
country of origin.
29   
 
Greenfield  versus  merger  and  acquisition.    Calderón,  Loayza,  and  Servén  (2004) 
distinguish the feedback and macroeconomic effects of greenfield foreign direct investment from 
those of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). M&A, although more prominent in industrialized 
countries, have also taken place in developing countries, particularly those undertaking extensive 
privatization. For a large sample of both industrial and developing countries, the authors find 
that, during 1987-2001, a greater number of mergers and acquisitions was followed by higher 
greenfield  investment,  while  it  was  only  in  developing  countries  that  higher  greenfield 
investment was followed by a greater number of mergers and acquisitions. In both industrial and 
developing countries, both types of FDI lead to domestic investment, but domestic investment 
does not lead to FDI of either type. Finally, neither type of FDI appears to precede economic 
growth in developing or industrial countries, but economic growth does have a positive effect on 
FDI. 
 
More  recently,  Neto,  Brandão,  and  Cerqueira  (2010)  study  the  differential  effect  of 
greenfield versus M&A on growth based on a panel of 53 countries over the period 1996-2006. 
The authors find evidence of bidirectional causality between FDI, M&A, and growth. They find 
that greenfield investment has a positive effects on economic growth in both developed and 
developing  countries,  while  M&A’s  effect  on  economic  growth  is  negative  in  developing 
countries and insignificant in developed countries.  Harms and Méon (2011) find that while 
greenfield FDI substantially enhances growth, M&A has, at best, no effect.  Problems common 
to all these studies are data availability and the sample selection bias of the different forms of 
investment.  Future  work  exploiting  long  time-series  should  help  us  better  understand  the 
different effects. 
 
Country of origin  Research has found that the country of origin matters. Girma and Görg 
(2007)  differentiate  acquirers  by  country  groups  in  their  investigation  on  wage  premia  and 
Javorcik  and  Spatareanu  (2008,  2011)  examine  the  impact  of  investor  origin  on  vertical 
spillovers from foreign direct investment.    
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011), in particular, use firm-level panel data from Romania to 
examine whether a foreign investor’s nationality affects the degree of vertical spillovers.  In this 
case, the Association Agreement between Romania and the European Union (EU) implies that 
inputs sourced from the EU are subject to a lower tariff than inputs sourced from the United 
States or Canada. American investors may therefore have a greater incentive, on average, than 
EU investors do to source from Romania; this creates greater potential for vertical spillovers. 
The  empirical  analysis  supports  this  hypothesis,  showing  a  positive  association  between  the 
presence of American companies in downstream sectors and the productivity of Romanian firms 
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29 Javorcik, and Spatareanu (2011), for example, find significant differences between effects associated with foreign 
investors of different nationality in Romania. Our data, however, do not allow controlling for these differences.    25 
in  the  supplying  industries  but  showing  no  significant  relationship  in  the  case  of  European 
affiliates. The results also indicate that Romanian firms in sectors whose products are expensive 
to transport benefit more from the downstream presence of American affiliates than Romanian 
firms in sectors with low shipping costs. No such pattern is found for European affiliates. 
 
Sectors  Alfaro (2003), using an UNCTAD dataset to investigate the effect of FDI on 
growth,  finds  suggestive  evidence  of  a  positive  effect  in  the  manufacturing  sector  but  only 
ambiguous evidence for the service sector. On the other hand, the effects of FDI in the primary 
sector tend to be negative. Although it might seem natural to argue that FDI can convey great 
advantages to host countries, such gains might differ across the primary, manufacturing, and 
service sectors. UNCTAD World Investment Report (2001: 138), for instance, argues that “in the 
primary sector, the scope for linkages between foreign affiliates and local suppliers is often 
limited…. The manufacturing sector has a broad variation of linkage intensive activities. [In] the 
tertiary sector the scope for dividing production into discrete stages and subcontracting out large 
parts  to  independent  domestic  firms  is  also  limited.”  A  stereotyped  contrast  can  be  drawn 
between  FDI  directed  towards  natural  resources,  as  exemplified  by  United  Fruit  Company-
Chiquita in Central America, and FDI directed towards labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, 
such as those in Singapore. 
 
Timing  Merlevede, Koen, and Spatareanu (2013) find that foreign entry initially affects 
the productivity of local competitors negatively, but that, once majority-foreign-owned firms 
have been present for a while, this drop is more than offset by a permanent positive effect on 
local competitors. The effect on the productivity of local suppliers, in contrast, is transient:  The 
entry of majority-foreign-owned firms boosts the productivity of local suppliers after a short 
adaption  period,  but  then  this  improvement  fades.  The  positive  impact  of  minority-foreign-
owned firms on local suppliers is immediate, but smaller and also transient. 
5. Evolution of FDI in Central America: Push-Pull Factors and Promotion
30 
The determinants of capital flows have been extensively examined in the literature. Calvo 
et  al.  (1996)  distinguished  between  the  role  of  external  (push)  and  domestic  (pull)  factors. 
External  factors  include  the  global  business  cycle,  the  integration  of  world  capital  markets, 
diversification  of  investments  internationally,  contagion  effects,  and  declining  world  interest 
rates, which improve creditworthiness and reduce default risk in developing countries. Domestic 
factors include the political and economic stability associated with monetary, fiscal, trade, and 
capital market policies.  But the most important drivers of FDI flows, in addition to technological 
advances and the political and macroeconomic environment, have been the attitudes of host 
countries regarding FDI’s potential costs and benefits.   
Foreign direct investment provokes strong emotions in both home and host (recipient) 
countries.  In home countries, some fear that foreign investment lowers domestic wages, destroys 
local jobs, and erodes technology leadership, while others believe that firms must invest abroad 
in order to remain competitive in an increasingly global environment. In recipient countries, 
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30 For a historical overview of international business, see Jones (1996).    26 
some  insist  that  FDI  accelerates  economic  development  by  bringing  new  capital  and 
technologies, while others fear that foreign control of local factors and assets will create enclaves 
and economic dependence.   
Policy  instruments  such  as  incentives,  trade  barriers,  and  direct  restrictions  against 
foreign  control  of  local  resources  or  sectors  have  paralleled  the  prevailing  political  mood 
regarding  FDI.  Over  the  past  three  decades  of  increased  global  financial  integration,  many 
governments adopted policies of financial liberalization and promotion in order to lure more 
capital flows.  
5.1. Trends: Evolution and Changes 
Over the last century, attitudes towards FDI have exhibited remarkable swings.   
International direct investments exploded from the 1880s until the early 20th century, 
boosted  by  economic  growth  and  improvements  in  transportation  and  communications  and 
becoming heavily concentrated (55%) in natural resources such as petroleum, coal, iron, and 
agricultural products. Throughout this period, governments did not attempt to control or restrict 
international  private  transactions  in  any  systematic  way.  FDI  enjoyed  this  liberal  business 
environment until the late 1920s.  In Central America, this first stage is that of the banana- and 
gold-producing  enclaves  (for  example,  the  United  Fruit  Company).  According  to  Bulmer-
Thomas (2003; taken from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [2010]), 
FDI for the seven countries of the region totaled approximately US$200 million, much of which 
was invested in the expansion of the rail network.  
World War I and the nationalization of foreign property in Russia in 1917 dealt heavy 
blows to FDI, but it was the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 that marked the end of its 
golden era. Stagnation in the world economy and the breakdown of the international financial 
system reduced the number of attractive investment opportunities. More importantly, receptivity 
toward  FDI  declined  during  the  1930s  and  restrictions  increased  worldwide  as  governments 
became concerned about its potential impact on their economies and national sovereignty.  Many 
countries, seeking to regain control of their natural resources, denounced the “extractive” nature 
of FDI, reflecting multinationals’ large involvement in the exploitation of natural resources.  
 
The 1960s brought a slow resurgence of FDI, largely due to a positive macroeconomic 
environment. This new wave of FDI, in contrast with the previous wave, was concentrated in 
manufacturing and in developed countries, with Western Europe, the United States, and Canada 
accounting for nearly two-thirds of inward FDI. Still, some manufacturing MNEs found new 
opportunities in countries pursuing import substitution development strategies. Some countries, 
while keeping tariff levels high to protect domestic industries, allowed MNEs to pursue “tariff 
jumping” investments and set up factories to cater to local markets. In Central America, the 
import substitution model and the formation of the Central American Common Market paralleled 
global trends.  
 
The 1970s and early 1980s brought a new wave of difficulties for FDI. Surging oil prices 
and the developing countries’ debt crisis slowed the flow of FDI, with both developing and 
developed countries questioning its merits.  But after years of skepticism, the pendulum swung 
back in favor of FDI in the late 1980s, as a broad consensus began to emerge regarding FDI’s   27 
potential  benefits  to  host  economies.  FDI  began  to  be  portrayed  as  a  means  to  improve  a 
society’s well-being by providing capital, technology, and know-how. 
This change in attitude may have been due to the fact that the 1980s debt crisis cut off 
developing countries’ access to credit and to portfolio investment. Moreover, the industries in 
which MNEs were now active—high technology and services—made FDI far more attractive to 
developing  countries  as  a  possible  promoter  of  technology  absorption.  As  relations  between 
MNEs  and  host  countries  improved,  governments  began  to  ease  restrictions  on  FDI  and 
increasingly  offered  incentives  in  an  effort  to  attract  investment  and  be  integrated  into  the 
globalized  economy.  One  of  the  most  dramatic  policy  changes  occurred  in  China,  as  the 
government gradually opened the domestic market to foreign companies.  
In  Central  America,  the  1980s  debt  crisis  signaled  a  break  with  the  state-led 
industrialization model and the adoption instead of an export-development model. With a new 
attitude towards FDI, now seen as an engine of growth and jobs, came important FDI promotion 
schemes.  Countries  also  liberalized  trade  and  negotiated  bilateral  and  multilateral  free-trade 
agreements.  During  the  1980s,  FDI  in  Central  America  was  concentrated  in  manufacturing, 
especially in the textile and clothing segments, and was channeled towards export activities, 
largely in pursuit of lower labor costs (export platforms to serve the U.S. market). Operations 
have been conducted essentially under free zones or similar systems. 
 
FDI soared worldwide during the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, with growth 
reaching 50% in 2006. The growth of FDI slowed down during the subprime mortgage crisis and 
subsequent recession, with different growth rates in the last years (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Central America and Dominican Republic: Selected Indicators on Foreign Direct 
Investment and International Production, 1990-2012 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Reports, 2013. 
FDI increased in Central America during the 1990s, triggered by demand and supply 
factors  such  as  the  privatization  of  state-owned  energy  and  telecommunications  companies 
(except in Costa Rica). Flows also increased due to the improved business climate—the greater 
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FDI!inflows 207 1,979 1,697 1,198 1,490 1,652 1,351 22.1 39.4 32.4 50.1 35.4 (14.2 (29.4 24.4 10.9 (18.2
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Gross!Fixed!Capital!Formation 5,099 12,399 13,824 12,735 13,940 15,770 16,278 5.4 1.1 11.8 10.9 13.8 11.5 (7.9 9.5 13.1 3.2
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economic and political stability—and to specific policies favorable to FDI.  With the prohibitions 
associated  with  the  Agreement  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures,  the  end  of  the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and greater competition from China and India, Central 
America lost its competitiveness in textiles and clothing.  Foreign firms increasingly began to 
invest instead in service industries, including tourism and business services. Flows have reached 
almost 6% of the region’s GDP and close to 25% of capital formation (see Figure 2). 
 
  Figure 2: Central America and Dominican Republic: Foreign Direct Investment, Net 
Inflows, 1990-2011 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2013. 
In the last decade, FDI flows to Panama as a percentage of GDP have surpassed those of 
other countries in the region (see Figure 3). These are largely associated with the Canal and 
Canal-related  services  and with  financial services, the real estate sector, and the creation of 
special economic zones such as the Panama-Pacific Special Economic Area and the Colón Free 
Zone.   
 
Costa Rica, unlike the other Central American countries, realized early on that the textile 
and  clothing  industry  was  losing  momentum  and  therefore  launched  policies  to  create  local 
skills. As documented by Spar (1998), CINDE, the Costa Rican investment promotion agency, 
explicitly decided in the late 1980s to shift out of textiles—as Costa Rican wage levels rose and 
competition  from  lower-wage  emerging  markets  mounted—and  to  concentrate  instead  on 
electronics. MNEs responded by investing in intermediate- and high-technology sectors. For the 
last decade, FDI flows that are generally between 4% and 6% of GDP have been a constant 
source of foreign capital for the country. 
 
FDI inflows into Guatemala have historically been sluggish in comparison with the rest 
of the region, particularly in proportion to the size of its domestic market. In the last decade, they 
have remained around 2% of GDP. The largest investments were the result of privatizations, 
particularly of the electricity grid and telecommunications services.  Textiles and garments have 
traditionally been the most attractive export-manufacturing sector for investors.   
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El Salvador has high variability; FDI reached almost 8% of GDP in 2007 but in recent 
years has been close to 2%, which is low for the region.  
 
Figure 3. Central America and Dominican Republic: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows as a 
Percentage of GDP by Country, 2005-2011 
 
  
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2013. 
Because of their low-income status, Nicaragua and Honduras have preferential access to 
the U.S. market through CAFTA. In addition, low wages have also allowed these countries to 
maintain their positions as major exporters of clothing to the U.S. Both countries have been able 
to attract FDI flows averaging more than 5% of GDP throughout the decade. Honduras has also 
attracted FDI into a number of sectors in addition to textiles and garments: light manufacturing 
(basic assembly of parts for the automobile and electronics industries), agriculture, and business 
services.  The effects of the controversial recent strategy for attracting investment by creating 
Hong-Kong-style charter cities remain to be seen. 
 
The Dominican Republic’s FDI inflows relate to its proximity to the United States, the 
size of its domestic market, and its reforms in the telecommunications and energy sectors. FDI 
has dominated the export businesses operating in the country’s economic zones. In addition, 
foreign companies producing goods and services for the domestic market have recently invested. 
Overall, FDI has been between 4% and 6% of GDP in the last decade. 
5.2. FDI Promotion and Incentives 
Both  developed  and  developing  countries  have  tried  to  lure  foreign  investors  with 
incentives designed to increase investment revenues and/or reduce (or transfer) the costs or risks. 
An incentive is any measurable economic advantage afforded to specific enterprises by (or at the 
direction of) a government in order to encourage certain behavior.  
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Fiscal incentives for FDI are designed to reduce the tax burden for foreign investors, 
while  financial  incentives  include  government  grants,  credit  at  subsidized  rates,  government 
equity participation, government guarantees, and insurance at preferential rates.  Other incentives 
include subsidized, dedicated services and infrastructure (often through duty-free export zones), 
foreign  exchange  privileges,  and  even  monopoly  rights.    Incentives  can  be  granted  at  the 
national, state, or municipal level. Furthermore, efforts to attract FDI can be broad-based or they 
can target specific sectors. Direct subsidies are often granted case by case. In 2005, 68 out of 81 
developing  countries  interviewed  in  the  Census  of  Investment  Promotion  Agencies  reported 
offering fiscal or other incentives to foreign investment (Harding and Javorcik, 2007).  
Some  host  countries  require  MNEs  to  establish  production  facilities  in  specified 
industries—or  in  specified  regions  such  as  export  processing  zones  and  special  economic 
zones—and  to  export  their  output.  Alfaro  and  Charlton  (forthcoming)  identify  the  sectors 
targeted  by  OECD  countries  between  1985  and  2001.  The  most  targeted  sectors  included 
machinery,  computers,  telecommunications,  and  transportation  equipment.  Heavily  targeted 
sectors  in  developing  countries  are  similar,  also  including  wholesale  trade,  transportation 
equipment, and petroleum. 
There  are  various  types  of  special  economic  zone  (SEZ),  including  free  trade  zones, 
export processing zones, free zones, industrial estates, free ports, and urban enterprise zones.
31 
Most countries offer a range of tariff, tax, and infrastructure incentives, as well as streamlined 
administration, to encourage firms to locate in such zones. 
In the past two decades, many developing countries have established SEZs to attract 
investment  in  their  economies.  These  SEZs  have  a  variety  of  goals:  providing foreign-exchange 
earnings, promoting nontraditional exports, providing jobs, and attracting foreign direct investment in an 
effort to foster technological transfer and knowledge spillovers. Many were created to provide an 
internationally competitive environment for exports relatively free of regulatory encumbrances. 
Others  were  seen  as  a  way  to  develop  the  manufacturing  sector  and  create  jobs.
32  Their 
characteristics have changed over time and now generally include duty-free access, generous tax 
holidays, financial incentives, and less red tape and better infrastructure than are found in the rest of the 
country.  Zones in the 1950s through the 1970s were typically government-owned, while an increasing 
number are now private.  
By  limiting  a  combination  of  financial  incentives,  reduced  red  tape,  and  trade 
liberalization to a subset of the economy, such policies may be suboptimal from an economic 
point of view, as resource allocation may be distorted and benefits may accrue to only a few. 
However, SEZs can still play a useful role in a country’s development if they serve as a catalyst 
for a reform process that is part of an overall national strategy. So far, studies of the costs and 
benefits of SEZs have presented us with mixed evidence. Some zones have attracted foreign 
direct investment—promoting exports and generating jobs—and others have not. In some cases, 
FDI has increased but has led to little or no technology transfer and no backward linkages. In 
many cases, moderately successful SEZs have actually led countries to defer necessary structural 
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32 See Omar and Stoever (2008).    31 
reforms, having served as safety valves rather than as catalysts for reform.
33 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) formally prohibited granting export subsidies after 
January 1, 2003. However, SEZs were deemed to be compliant with WTO rules as long as the 
incentives offered were not contingent on export performance; there were no restrictions on sales 
to the domestic market.
34 
Although the WTO agreement on subsidies dates back to 1995 and the export subsidies 
under  export  promotion  regimes  were  eliminated,  no  Central  American  countries  eliminated 
income tax incentives in their free zones. On the contrary, since income tax exemption was 
considered  one  of  the  main  attractions  bringing  FDI  into  Central  America  under  export 
promotion regimes, these countries, along with other small and developing countries, managed to 
obtain a five-year extension of the deadline for dismantling export subsidies, followed by another 
two-year extension; thus, these subsidies were allowed to remain in place through 2009. Before 
the 2009 deadline was reached, yet one more extension was granted, this time to December 2015, 
but the countries of the region had to accept that the new deadline would be non-extendible. 
 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama have drawn up proposals 
to  reform  their  incentive  regimes.  Honduras  and  Nicaragua  will  not  need  to  modify  their 
incentive  schemes  as  long  as  they  retain  their  status  as  low-per-capita-income  countries.  A 
common feature in all the free-zone-regime reforms approved or under discussion is the granting 
of total or partial exemption from income tax. In addition, sectors to which the incentives are 
awarded now include strategic sectors (such as high-technology and R&D-intensive activities) 
and relatively less-developed areas within each country.  
5.3. Are FDI Incentives Needed? 
Although some studies minimize the role of government incentives in foreign investment 
decisions, both developed and developing countries try to lure foreign investors by granting 
special treatment to FDI. Many policy makers and academics argue that developing countries 
should  strive  to  attract  foreign  direct  investment  as  a  means  of  generating  higher  economic 
growth and as a source of direct capital financing and of valuable productivity externalities for 
domestic firms. Yet today’s more conducive environment for FDI has sparked a new debate 
regarding the concessions offered to foreign firms. Does FDI warrant special treatment over 
other forms of investment?  What is the range of incentives available to policy makers? What are 
the costs and benefits associated with this competition across countries to attract foreign firms 
and how do MNEs respond to these incentives? 
In policy discussions, it is sometimes argued that incentives to attract FDI are justified as 
a way to generate employment, but when there is already full employment, this is certainly not a 
valid argument.  Even where there is unemployment, it is not clear that more investment will 
help; that would depend on the causes and nature of the unemployment. A more sophisticated 
argument is that FDI incentives are a valid way to increase the capital stock and thereby allow 
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wages to increase. For this approach to be cost-efficient, however, the rate of return to capital in 
the host country must be higher than it is in source countries. But if such were the case, then the 
incentive would not be necessary.  
A related and valid reasoning is that FDI tax incentives are justified as part of an optimal 
tax policy if the investment elasticity to taxes is higher for FDI than for national investment. The 
problem with this approach, of course, is that it is ultimately self-defeating; countries would 
compete away the rents and pass them on to multinationals. 
 
If foreign capital is more mobile than local capital, it could be argued that governments 
might want to tax income from foreign capital—both FDI and portfolio investment—at lower 
rates. In general, however, economists argue that for FDI to merit special treatment over other 
forms of investment, there needs to be some form of market failure such as externalities and 
spillovers. 
Advocates of incentives argue that FDI, by its very nature, has important positive effects 
on host economies beyond the direct capital financing it supplies and the jobs it creates. FDI can 
help  introduce  new  processes,  managerial  skills,  and  superior  know-how  into  the  domestic 
market while promoting international production networks and access to foreign markets, all of 
which create valuable productivity spillovers. Increased competition arising from the entry of 
foreign firms can force local firms to modernize, introduce new technologies, and become more 
efficient. FDI can also foster linkages with local firms and help jump-start an economy. Finally, 
countries might want to promote FDI because it is less volatile than portfolio investment flows.  
Others disagree and question whether FDI’s potential benefits justify special treatment. 
This skeptical view has been influenced by empirical studies at both the firm and national levels 
that show mixed results in terms of FDI’s growth-enhancing externalities.  But as mentioned 
above,  the  evidence  that  FDI  generates  positive  spillovers  in  host  countries  suggests  that  a 
country's  capacity  to  take  advantage  of  these  externalities  might  be  limited  by  local 
complementarities  and  conditions  such  as  infrastructure,  education  levels,  and  the  policy 
environment.  In sum, generalizations are difficult to make.  
Some  policy  makers  and  government  officials  are  concerned  that,  in  the  context  of 
competition  to  attract  FDI,  the  granting  of  benefits  by  one  country—or  a  region  within  a 
country—may trigger similar responses by other potential host countries, precipitating a “race to 
the bottom,” at which point the incentives given to FDI end up exceeding the social gains and 
are, in fact, a net loss for the “winning” country.     
6. Concluding Comments 
New research insights into the role of complementarities and into the mechanisms by 
which  FDI  induces  growth  (when  it  does)  have  been  an  important  step  in  reconciling  the 
ambiguous evidence on FDI’s ability to generate growth in host countries.  The research on 
complementarities  has  shown  that  FDI’s  positive  impacts  are  not  exogenous,  but  rather  are 
conditional on certain local conditions.  Research into the mechanisms and channels by which 
FDI  can  generate  positive  externalities  goes  one  step  further,  illustrating  how 
complementarities—such as a competitive environment to ensure that market share is allocated 
to  the  most  productive  firms  or  developed  financial  markets  to  ensure  that  vertical  supply   33 
relations develop into meaningful linkages—can act as “absorptive capacities” to facilitate the 
benefits from FDI. Emerging research on the relation between organization and productivity on 
the one hand and effects of MNEs on the other hand aims to understand these questions better. 
 
What are the policy implications of this research? FDI can play an important role in 
economic growth, most likely via suppliers, but local conditions matter and can limit the extent 
to which FDI benefits materialize. It is not clear that incentives to attract MNEs are warranted. 
More  sensible  policies  might  involve  eliminating  barriers  that  prevent  local  firms  from 
establishing  adequate  linkages;  improving  local  firms’  access  to  inputs,  technology,  and 
financing; and streamlining the procedures associated with selling inputs. Countries might also 
seek to improve domestic conditions, which should have the dual effect of attracting foreign 
investment  (Alfaro,  Kalemli-Ozcan,  and  Volosovych,  2007,  2008)  and  enabling  the  host 
economy to maximize the benefits of that investment. Tax incentives that remain in force should 
be valued in terms of their impact on public finances and should be viewed as one of the possible 
instruments whereby FDI can be established and linked to the local economy as a means of 
transferring  know-how  and  technology  and  fostering  linkages.  Understanding  the  location 
interdependence of multinational firms and how they agglomerate with one another is critical to 
designing these economic policies (Alfaro and Chen, 2012b). But research suggests that sensible 
policies should also aim at improving domestic conditions, including credit access and labor 
supply  (particularly,  the  supply  of  skilled  labor),  while  eliminating  regulatory  barriers  to 
facilitating gains from competition and reallocation of resources. 
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